Introduction
In Sweden, an icon of the post-1945 bureaucratic welfare state, the Social Democrats themselves characterized the 2010 parliamentary election as a 'catastrophe for the party' and were shaken by the fact that only slightly less than a third of the electorate supported them. Yet the norms and forms of welfare state government has been drifting for more than three decades (Blyth 2001) . This chapter will address this drift through a focus on changes in urban governance in relation to commercial real estate ownership concentration in inner-city Gothenburg. In Gothenburg, with a City Council coalition majority based on the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Left Party, public-private cooperation in inner-city planning and governance is administered through a private joint-stock company called Inner City Gothenburg Co.
The last 30 years of change towards 'governing without government' (Rhodes 1996) through advanced liberal forms of networked and market-oriented 'governance-beyond-the-state' have included three fundamental shifts (Swyngedouw 2005) . First, an externalization of state functions through deregulation and privatization; second, a transfer of some nation state governmental functions to higher scales of governance; accompanied, third, by a simultaneous down-scaling of other governmental functions. Resulting in greater local differentiation and a situation where new social actors enter into the arena of governing, this process in turn points to a fourth shift related to questions of political legitimacy, namely a 'dismantling of traditional relays of democratic control at national and subnational levels ' (Brenner and Theodore 2002a: 365) . A widespread 'idealized-normative model of horizon tal, non-exclusive and participatory (stake)holder-based governance' (Swyngedouw 2005 (Swyngedouw : 1995 suggests that these shifts are all-inclusive, yet they have often resulted in a 'quango-ization' of the state with multiple problems of representation and accountability ('quango' is short for quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization, see Miller and Rose 2008: 213) . In order to achieve social consent around reforms in advanced liberal direction, ideational factors have importantly functioned as 'integral components of institutional construction and change by conceptualizing them as weapons, blueprints, and cognitive locks' (Blyth 2001: 23) . To reiterate an image of advanced liberal governance as being 'democracy enhancing' and delivering 'more effective forms of governing compared with the sclerotic, hierarchical and bureaucratic state forms that conducted the art of governing during much of the 20th century' (Swyngedouw 2005 (Swyngedouw : 1992 has thus been an essential component in the last 30 years of change.
In Sweden, the sclerotic-bureaucratic art of governing included the Social Democrats' ambition of 1944 'to liberate the majority from dependency on a minority of capital owners; and to replace the social order of economic classes with a community of citizens cooperating on a foundation of freedom and equality' (quoted from the 1944 party-programme in Hirdman 1990: 257). 1 Also in 1944, Lennart Wallenstam started up as a small building entrepreneur in Gothenburg (Wallenstam 2011b). The Wallenstam company's major owner today is Hans Wallenstam, and the stock market value is US $1.6 billion, while the market value of properties is US $3.6 billion (Wallenstam 2011a). Wallenstam is one of the seven real estate owners studied in this chapter. Much has been written on the move towards public-private growth coalitions and entrepreneurial governance (cf. Brenner and Theodore 2002b; Hall and Hubbard 1998; Leitner, Peck and Sheppard 2007; Molotch 1976) , and there are discussions of shifting ownership patterns (cf. Dixon 2009), but rarely has on-the-ground data of real estate ownership concentration been discussed in relation to changes in urban governance forms. This chapter will, first, discuss 40 years of data on the ongoing process of concentration of ownership to commercial real estate in the Inom Vallgraven district in Gothenburg. I will address this in terms of structural shifts in the urban space economy. Second, I will suggest that in relation to present governance issues, the data on this concentration process needs to be seen in the light of a situation where companies, through increased market capitalization, confront possibilities of increased growth simultaneously with competitive dangers that push towards measures for influencing spatial governance. Third, the chapter proceeds with a discussion of present governance forms in inner-city
